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NELA TOURO CONFERENCE 1999 SELECTED
SECOND CIRCUIT CASES OF INTEREST
Lawrence Solotoff'
The Second Circuit was busy in 1999, weighing in on a
number of open and unanswered questions of interest to the Labor
and Employment bar.
I. MANDATORY STATUTORY ARBITRATION
I draw your attention to the circuit court's decision on
September 22, 1999 in Desiderio v. National Ass'n of Securities
Dealers, Inc.2 On January 15, 1997, the plaintiff filed a complaint
in federal district court, before Judge Leisure, against the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), seeking to invalidate the
mandatory arbitration provision of Form U-4, which she was
required to sign in order to register with the NASD for
employment as a securities broker.3 She refused to sign the
agreement which mandated arbitration of employment-related
disputes, and she refused to waive her right to a jury trial under
Title VII. 4 The NASD informed her prospective employer, who
had no trouble with the plaintiff modifying the agreement, that the
plaintiff could not be registered as a broker.5 As a result, her
offer of employment was revoked.6
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's case on the grounds
that she failed to state a claim pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("FRCP"). 7 The issue on appeal was "whether a
Partner, Solotoff & Solotoff; Fellow, College of Labor and Employment
Attorneys; Adjunct Professor, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center; Co-Author, "Sex and Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace," Law Journal Seminars Press, 1994 (updated semi-annually).
2 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).
3 Desiderio v. Nat'l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 516, 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
4 Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 200.
5 Id. at 201.
6id.
7 Desiderio, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 522. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(l).
Rule 12(b)(6) provides:
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pre-dispute agreement requiring compulsory arbitration, such as
Form U-4, was enforceable with regard to Title VII claims."' The
SEC was dismissed as a defendant in the case, which resulted in
the NASD being the only appellee. 9 The Second Circuit affirmed
the lower court's determination to dismiss plaintiff's case."0 While
a large majority of circuit courts have held that Form U-4 validly
applies to Title VII claims,'1 the Ninth Circuit held that the Form
U-4 compulsory arbitration clause was unenforceable with regard
to Title VII claims.
1 2
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ....
Id. Rule 12(b)(1) provides:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claijn, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter ....
Id.
" Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 203.
9 Id. at 201. The appeal against the SEC was stipulated to be withdrawn. Id.
10 Id. (citing Desiderio, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 522).
" See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1,
7 (1st Cir. 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980
(1996); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir.
1991); Willis, v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir.
1991); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc. 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 44 (1999); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare,
Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997); Metz v. Merryl Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1992); Cole v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
12 But see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998). See POLICY STATEMENT ON
[Vol 161282
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The conflict in the circuit courts originates from varying
interpretations of Gilmer v. Interstate/Joluson Lane Corp.13 The
Second Circuit adopted the Gilmer principle, as has a majority of
the circuits. 14 This principle states that, "arbitration agreements
are enforceable with regard to statutory claims 'unless Congress
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue ... ,5 Title VII, as amended by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,16 specifically "encouraged" the use
of arbitration to supplement, not supplant, the rights and remedies
in Title VII.17 Effective January 1, 1999 the NASD adopted a rule
change that abolished mandatory NASD arbitration of statutory
employment discrimination claims.' 8  Following the Second
Circuit's ruling in Desiderio, plaintiffs with currently pending
MANDATORY BINDING ARBrTRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT, 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA)
N:3101 (July 10, 1997).
13 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
14 Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 203. See supra note 11-12 and accompanying text.
'
5 Id. at 204 (quoting Gilner, 500 U.S. at 26).
16 42 U.S.C. § 1981-A (2000). This section provides in pertinent part:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the
use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of
Federal law amended by this title ....
Id.
17 Id.
18 63 Fed. Reg. 35299 (June 22, 1998). This regulation provides in pertinent
part:
The proposed rule change will modify the current
requirement that associated persons arbitrate all disputes
arising out of their employment or termination of
employment with a member broker/dealer. The proposed
rule provides that associated persons are no longer required,
solely by virtue of their association or their registration with
the NASD, to arbitrate claims of statutory employment
discrimination. Associated persons still will be required to
arbitrate other employment-related claims, as well as any
business-related claims involving investors or other persons.
2000 1283
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statutory discrimination claims that were filed before January 1,
1999 are still compelled to arbitrate. 19 The NASD amendmene
and the SEC's Order Granting Approval21 only apply to claims
filed on or after January 1, 1999.22
II. AGE DISCRIMINATION
In Cooper v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 23 three
separate cases were heard in tandem for the purpose of the circuit
court's consideration of the issue as to whether federal courts had
subject matter jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), brought by
individuals against state agencies or officials.24 The Second
Circuit held, "the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the district
courts of jurisdiction over ... ADEA claims because the Congress
abrogated the States' sovereign immunity through a valid exercise
of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5 The court
held that Congress may abrogate the States' sovereign immunity if
it (1) provides a "clear legislative mandate" of its intent to
abrogate, and, (2) legislates pursuant to a valid exercise of its
enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.26
19 Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 202.
20 63 Fed. Reg. 35299. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
21 See id. at 35300 (order granting approval).
22 See id. at 35301.
23 162 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1998).
24 Cooper, 162 F.3d at 772. See 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994). Section 621(b)
provides:
It is therefore the purpose of this Act [29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et
seq.;] to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment.
Id. at 773. U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV, § 5 provides in pertinent part: "The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." Id.
26 Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 59
(1996)).
[Vol 161284
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The 1974 amendments to the ADEA extended its scope by adding
the States and their agencies to the definition of "employer," 27 and
by adding "employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government" to the definition of "employee." 28 The 1974
amendments did not alter the ADEA enforcement provisions in 29
U.S.C. § 626(c). 29 "The ADEA simply leaves no room to dispute
whether states and state agencies are included among the class of
potential defendants when sued under the ADEA for their actions
as 'employers."' 30  The Second Circuit agreed "with the
overwhelming weight of authority holding that the ADEA was
adopted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3'
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
Second Circuit's holding in Cooper32 in light of Kinel v. Florida
Board of Regents.33 In Kimel, the Supreme Court held, "the
ADEA does contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to
abrogate the States' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeded
Congress' authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."34
The Court found that Congress had no reason to believe that the
state and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating
against their employees because of their age.
I. RACE DISCRIMINATION, RACIAL HARASSMENT,
RETALIATION
27 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.
55, § 28(a)(2) (amending 29 U.S.C. Section 630(b)).
2 See id. § 28(a)(4) (anending Section 29 U.S.C. Section 630 (f)).29 See Cooper, 162 F.3d at 775.
30 Id. (quoting Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d
Cir. 1996)).
31 Id. at 777 (referring to Coger v. Board of Regents of the State of Tenn., 154
F.3d 296, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1998); Scott v. University. of Miss., 148 F.3d 493,
500-03 (5th Cir. 1998); Keeton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055,
1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v. Board of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 141
F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 1998); Hurd v. Pittsburgh State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540,
1544-46 (10th Cir. 1997); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690,
695 (3d Cir. (1996); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 700 (Ist
Cir. 1983)).32Id. at 772.
33 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
34 Id. at 637.
2000 1285
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In Richardson v. New York State Department of Correction
Services. ,35 the plaintiff, an African-American female and former
Department of Corrections employee, brought claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,36 alleging that she was
subjected to a racially hostile work environment and was retaliated
against when she protested and filed a lawsuit to remedy that
discrimination. 37 The court reversed, in part, the dismissal, by the
lower court, of her hostile work environment and retaliation
claims.38
The issue before the circuit court was whether Richardson's
allegations of racial slurs and abuse should be evaluated to
determine whether a reasonable person who is the target of
discrimination would find the working conditions so severe or
pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of employment for
the worse.39 The circuit court "rejecte[d] the view of those courts
that look to the perspective of the particular ethnic or gender
group, for example, a 'reasonable African-American' or a
'reasonable Jew."' 40 The court articulated, "[w]e believe that
examining hostile environment claims from the perspective of a
'reasonable person who is the target of racially or ethnically
oriented remarks' is the proper approach." 41 The court stated:
First, Title VII seeks to protect those that are the targets
of such conduct, and it is their perspective, not that of
bystanders or the speaker, that is pertinent. Second, this
standard makes it clear that triers of fact are not to
determine whether some ethnic or gender groups are
more thin-skinned than others.42
3 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 3(a) (2000), N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 et seq.
(McKinney 2000).
37 Richardson, 180 F.3d at 432.
38 Id. at 449-50. (reversing Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correction
Servs., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20719 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997).
39 Id. at 436.
40 Id. at 436, n.3.
4' Id. at 436, n.3.42Id. at 436.
[Vol 161286
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Furthermore, the court held "[t]here is neither a threshold
'magic number' of harassing incidents that give rise, without
more, to liability as a matter of law, nor a number of incidents
below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim."43
The court stated that Richardson, in order to prevail on her Title
VII hostile environment claim, must show more than isolated
comments, for instance, "Black inmates look alike." 44 Instead,
"she must produce evidence that she was discriminated against
because of her race" 45 and must prove that "the conduct
complained of was prompted by victim's status. 46
IV. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
In Norville v. Staten Island University Hospital,47 the plaintiff,
a 56 year old black female nurse, suffered a spinal injury while at
work.48 This injury required that she avoid heavy lifting,
stretching, and bending.49 Following an extended leave of absence
and requests for accommodations, Norville was offered an
alternative position that would have required her to lose her
seniority rights, frozen her pension benefits, increased her
vulnerability to layoffs, and provided fewer opportunities with
respect to new openings and assignments. 50  After rejecting the
assignment, she was offered part-time employment. 5' Norville
then submitted an application for a position for which she was
43 Richardson, 180 F.3d.at 439 (citing Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins.
Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 1993); See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17 (1993) (noting that hostile environment analysis "is not, and by its
nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test").
44Id. at 440.
45 Id.
46 Id. (quoting Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d
Cir. 1989).
47 196 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999).
48 Id. at 93.
4 9 Id.
501d. at 94.51 id.
2000 1287
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qualified, however, the hospital awarded the position to an
individual who had less seniority than Norville. 52  The hospital
terminated her employment after she rejected the part-time offer.53
The case went to trial before Judge Melancon on Norville's
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and other civil rights
claims. 54 The jury entered judgment for the hospital on the ADA
claims, and the court entered judgment for the hospital on all the
other claims pursuant to FRCP Rule 50(a)r t
Norville argued on appeal that the jury verdict for the hospital
on her ADA claims rested on an erroneous jury charge.5 6  The
court pointed out, "[s]pecifically, she claimed that the court erred
in failing to instruct the jury that an employer's offer of an inferior
position does not constitute 'reasonable accommodation' under the
ADA when jobs comparable to the employee's former position are
vacant."57 The Second Circuit held that, in order for the ADA
plaintiff to prevail where the employer has offered reassignment as
a reasonable accommodation, "the employee must offer evidence
showing both that the position offered was inferior to her former
job and that a comparable position, for which the employee was
qualified, was open." 5 8  The employer may demonstrate that no
position was available, that the employer need not create a position
to accommodate, or that the employee was not qualified for the
vacant position. 59  The burden is on the employee to prove
'2 Norville, 196 F.3d at 94.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 93.
" Id. FED. R. Crv. P. 50(a)(1) states:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury
to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the
issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense
that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated
without a favorable finding on that issue.
Id.
56 Norville, 196 F.3d at 98.
57 Id.
'8 Id. at 99.
59 Id.
1288 [Vol 16
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qualification under the ADA,6° and the employer may prove undue
hardship. 61
The challenged jury instruction reads as follows:
The defendant has an obligation to reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff. A reasonable accommodation
is one that does not impose an undue hardship upon the
defendant; in this case, the defendant's nursing
department. The law does not require the employer to
provide every accommodation the disabled employee may
request, as long as the accommodation provided is
reasonable. The plaintiff does not have the right to choose
her reasonable accommodation. 62
60 Id. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o) (2000). This section provides:
The term reasonable accommodation means: (i) Modifications
or adjustments to a job application process that enable a
qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the
position such qualified applicant desires; or (ii) Modifications
or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or
circumstances under which the position held or desired is
customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with
a disability to perform the essential functions of that position;
or (iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered
entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and
privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly
situated employees without disabilities.
Id.
61 Norville, 196 F.3d at 99. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). This
subsection provides in pertinent part:
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term
"discriminate" includes . . . not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity ....
Id.
62Id. at 100.
2000 1289
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The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's
rejection of the above instruction and adopted Norville's
counsel's proposed instruction, that "it was not a reasonable
accommodation to attempt to assign a disabled employee to a
worse position where they would suffer in some way, either by
being segregated or receiving less benefits." 63 The court added
that the jury should have been instructed that, "an offer of an
inferior position does not qualify as a reasonable accommodation
when a comparable position is available. "'64 Moreover, the jury
should determine "whether the positions proposed were in fact
inferior and whether a comparable position was vacant." 65
V. RETALIATORY TERMINATION
In Holava-Brown v. General Electric, Co. ("G.E. ),66 the
plaintiff was a temporary leased female employee, working on a
computer-assisted design project and assignment pursuant to a
written contract for an anticipated duration of six months. 67 She
testified, however, that her supervisor told her the assignment
would last for a year to a year and a half.68 She complained about
her supervisor's sexual advances shortly after arriving on the job
in October 1991.69 Her job assignment was scheduled to end in
April 1992.70 In April 1992, she was terminated.7' Holava
Brown brought suit against GE, where she had been assigned to
work, TAD Resources International, .the temporary employment
agency, and Lockheed Martin Corporation. 72 The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all her claims including
her claim of retaliatory discharge, but did allow her sexual
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20146 (2d Cir. 1999).671 Id., at *2.
68 Id., at *2-3.69 Id., at *3.
70 Id.
71 Id., at *3
72 HolaVaBroWn, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20146, at *4.
1290 [Vol 16
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harassment claims to go to a jury trial.73 The jury awarded a
verdict on behalf of G.E.74 The issue on appeal was whether the
district court properly granted summary judgment on the issue of
retaliatory discharge and punitive damages.
Specifically, the Second Circuit was asked to determine
whether "failure to renew an employee's contract, when an oral
commitment had been made two or three months after that
employee had complained of sexual harassment, could allow a
reasonable jury to infer that the decision not to renew the contract
was retaliatory. " 76  The court answered affirmately, stating,
"[w]here an employee has engaged in continuing protected
activity, all of that activity should be taken into account in
analyzing its causal relationship to the adverse employment
action." 77 However, the court determined, that though evidence
suggested the pretextual nature of her termination, GE articulated
a "legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason for her termination.78
That is, that her job had been completed and the position she
vacated was no longer needed or filled. 79  Holava-Brown was
unable to demonstrate that GE's claim of non-discriminatory
discharge was indeed a pretext for retaliation.80 Her allegations
that her contract would have been extended for a year or more was
insufficient, without more, to meet her burden of retaliatory
animus. 81 She was unable to prove, for example, that work
remaining unfinished was work that could only be done by her.8 2
VI. BACK PAY, FRONT PAY, LOST PENSION RIGHTS,
AND REDUCTION IN FORCE IN ADEA CLAIM
73 Id., at *5.
74id.
75 Id.
76 Id., at *11-12.
'n Id., at *12.
78 Holava-Brown, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20146., at *13.
79id.
'o Id., at *14.
81 Id., at *15.
12Id., at *16.
2000 1291
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In Banks v. The Travelers Cos.,83 the issues before the
district court were whether the plaintiff, who was terminated in
January, 1994, and was awarded $77,127 in damages for age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), was eligible for back pay between April 1, 1996, the
date of a reduction in force subsequent to her illegal termination
for age discrimination and the jury verdict and district court
judgment, and whether she was eligible for front pay after
judgment. 84 The district court ruled that Banks' retention after a
reduction in force was too speculative for the jury and denied her
damage claims.85 The Second Circuit reversed, and remanded
the case to the district court holding that the district court should
have instructed the jury that it could award damages for the
period from April 1, 1996 to the date of the verdict. 86 Banks was
entitled to argue that, "but for the earlier act of discrimination,
she would have been retained amid the employer's subsequent
layoffs.",87 The court stated, "[a] jury would be permitted but
not necessarily required to accept that inference." 88
The Second Circuit reasoned that, "[b]ecause reinstatement
and front pay are forward looking remedies, they are inappropriate
where the employment would already have ended by the time of
judgment." 89 in this regard, the district court erred in concluding
that plaintiff had not introduced sufficient evidence to allow an
inference that she would have been retained after April 1996 had
" 180 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999).84 Id. at 361.85 Id. at 363.
86 Id. at 368.
87 Id. at 363.
88 Id. at 363 (stating, "the evidence presented at trial would have permitted a
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Banks would have been retained
following the April 1996 reduction in force had she not been discriminatorily
discharged in January 1994."). Id. at 361.
89 Banks, 180 F.3d at 365. (referring to Kirsch v Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d
149, 169; Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding
reinstatement unwarranted where plaintiff had been hired only for a one-year
term and that term had expired)).
1292 [Vol 16
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she not been discharged discriminatorily in 1994.90 Prospective
relief for front pay was therefore not precluded altogether. 91
Finally, because lost pension rights fall within the category of
equitable relief,92 the district court erred in ruling that the issue of
lost pension benefits should have been presented to the jury. 93
VII. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE, TANGIBLE
EMPLOYMENT ACTION
In Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,94 the
plaintiff, an African-American woman, claimed sexual
harassment and constructive discharge as a "tangible employment
action." 95 The circuit court ruled that a constructive discharge is
not a tangible employment decision.96  The court stated: A
tangible employment decision requires an official act of the
enterprise, a company act . . . For these reasons, a tangible
90Id. at 365.
91 Id.92 Id. at 365 (quoting Geller, 635 F.2d at 1036).
93 1d. at 361.
94 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
95 Id. at 293-94. Pursuant to the precedent of Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998), an employer is strictly liable without regard for affirmative
defenses for tangible employment actions. In Caridad, the plaintiff claimed
she was sexually harassed by her supervisor when she worked with an all male
crew as an electrician for Metro-North. She also stated in her deposition that
she was subjected to a hostile work environment by her male co-workers.
Plaintiff did not follow established company procedures for sexual harassment
complaints, but admitted to it at a disciplinary hearing held to address her
absenteeism. She did not mention the sexual harassment to Metro-North's
Director of Affirmative Action, during her meeting with him; she simply
complained that she was being "treated poorly." She continued to refuse to
give Metro North the details of her sexual harassment, yet Metro-North
offered a transfer to another shift and to another position. She refused these
offers. She resigned a few months later and her complaint with the
Affirmative Action department was officially closed. Based on the above
facts, Metro-North moved for summary judgment on their liability in the
sexual harassment claim, and won. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290-91.96Id. at 294-95.
2000 1293
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employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII
purposes the act of the employer .... 97
Co-workers, as well as supervisors, can cause the
constructive discharge of an employee. And, unlike demotion,
discharge, or similar economic sanctions, an employee's
constructive discharge is not ratified or approved by the
employer. 98 Thus, although, we have stated in another context
that 'when a constructive discharge is found, an employee's
resignation is treated . . . as if the employer had actually
discharged the employee,' 99 constructive discharge is not a
tangible employment action warranting the imposition of strict
liability under the Ellerth/Faragher standard." 00
Under this standard, the court found that strict liability did
not apply, and then analyzed Metro-North's entitlement to an
affirmative defense.' 0' The court concluded that Metro-North
could assert the affirmative defense, given that it had policy and
procedures to deal with sexual harassment, and that the plaintiff
did not avail herself of the opportunity to report her sexual
harassment, as well as other facts.' 0 2 Hence, the Second Circuit
dismissed Caridad's sexual harassment claim against Metro-
North. 103
VIII. BENIGN COMMENTS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 10 the plaintiff asserted claims
of age discrimination and hostile work environment. The district
97 Id. at 294 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
98 Id.
99 Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987).
'oo Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295 (quoting Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d
1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987)).
101 Id. An employer may make out an affirmative defense if it demonstrates
that "a) it exercised reasonable care in preventing and correcting any sexually
harassing behavior, and b) the plaintiff -employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities." Id.
102 Id. at 295-96.
103 Id. at 296.
'04 174 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff claimed age discrimination pursuant
to ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000), and New York Human Rights
Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 et seq. (2000). The plaintiff complained that
1294 [Vol 16
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 4, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/12
NELA CONFERENCE 1999
court granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of
law, I0 5 dismissing the hostile work environment claim. The
Second Circuit looked to Faragher,10 6 which held that a defense
to liability or damages comprises two elements: (1) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise. 0 7 The employer argued that the key
to these issues was the plaintiffs subjective belief and whether
she suffered an adverse impact on her work performance. o' The
Second Circuit reasoned, in reversing the Rule 50 dismissal, that
the EEOC regulations defined "sexual harassment" in the
disjunctive to include conduct that "has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment." 109 The lower court did not consider the challenged
conduct, that is, the "young and sexy"1 t° comment as sufficient
to demonstrate a hostile work environment."' The circuit court
disagreed.11 2 The circuit court concluded that, "however benign
the mere use of the term 'sexy' might seem, its incorporation into
a threat of employment termination could reasonably be viewed
she was fired because of her age (62 years), and while she was working, she
was subjected to a hostile work environment. She stated that her supervisor
commented often that he wanted to hire a "young and sexy" sales staff and
had screamed at them at a Christmas party. On the age discrimination claim,
plaintiff sought to prove that she was terminated despite her positive
evaluations, because of her age. She brought in testimony of two ex-workers
who were also terminated at age 62. Id. at 265-66.
05 ld. at 264.
'0 524 U.S. 775.
107 Leopold, 174 F.3d at 267-68 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)).
The defense is subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at
268.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Kinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
Meritor quotes 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(a) (2000)).
1o See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
"' Leopold, 174 F.3d at 266.
12 Id. at 271.
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as a form of discriminatory intimidation. "113  The court found
that issues of "continuous and concerted," that is, pervasive, as
opposed to "episodic" or "sporadic" conduct are factual
questions when viewed from a FRCP Rule 50 point of view.'"
4
Facts are required to be viewed most favorable to the non-
moving party. 1 5
IX. NLRB JURISDICTION AND BACK PAY CLAIMS,
DISCRIMINATION, AND UNION ACTIVITY
In National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") v. Thalbo
Corp., 116 the plaintiff was an open supporter of a union campaign
seeking to organize the corporation. 117 The plaintiff, after having
been on sick leave, requested reinstatement to work."18  The
employer denied her request. 119  The NLRB, in Thalbo 1, '0
found that the denial of her request for reinstatement was in
violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA").121 In July 1994, Thalbo was ordered
to reinstate immediately. 122 Thalbo was moved to enforcement,
in Thalbo H, in May 1995.123 By 1997, as a result of non-
compliance, in Thalbo III, the NLRB issued a remedial order
requiring the employer to pay the plaintiff $40,410.00 in back
"
3 Id. at 269.
114 Id.
"' Id. See FED R. Civ. P. 50(a). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
116 171 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1999)
117 Id. at 105.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 314 N.L.R.B. 367 (1994).
121 Id. at 370. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (a)(3) (2000). Section
158(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7. Id. Section 158(a)(3) provides in
pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." Id.
122 Thalbo I, 314 N.L.R.B. at 370.
123 Thalbo 11, 57 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995).
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pay.124 This ruling was in direct conflict with the interim federal
magistrate ruling decided in 1995 granting limited back pay of
$7,521.125 The employer sought to preclude under Title VII, and
the NLRB sought enforcement from the Second Circuit. 126
After Thalbo's initial refusal to reinstate in 1991, the
plaintiff fied a sexual harassment complaint in federal court
asserting the garden variety of claims under Title VII. 127 The
case was tried before a magistrate in March 1995,128 who found
for the plaintiff, granting her limited "back pay" to 1991, but
also held that the reason the plaintiff was refused reinstatement to
work was due to the NLRA violations. 129 In Thalbo 111, the
employer argued preclusion before the NLRB Administrative
Law Judge (AIA), citing collateral estoppel. 130 The ALJ rejected
this argument on the ground that the NLRB had not been a party
to the Title VII action and, therefore the NLRB could not be
bound by the magistrate's rulings. 131 The ALU denied Thalbo's
objection holding that the NLRB is not precluded from litigating
an issue involving enforcement of the NLRA. 132 The NLRA
§ 10(a) provides that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor
practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that had, has been or may be established by
agreement, law or otherwise."' 33 There is also the well settled
principle that Congress has exclusively entrusted the Board with
"the prosecution of the proceedings by its own complaint, the
conduct of the hearing, the adjudication and the granting of
appropriate relief." 134
124 323 N.L.R.B. 630 (1997).
'2 DiMilta v. G.B. Motel Mgmt., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6468 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
20, 1995).
126 NRB, 171 F.3d at 105.
21 Id. at 106.
128 id.
' 9 Id. at 106-07.
130 Thalbo III, 323 N.L.R.B. at 634.
131 id.
132 id.
133 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000)).
134 Id.
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The magistrate found that the plaintiff was retired and was
not entitled to back pay past the 1991 incident. 35 The NLRB
ALJ found that the plaintiff mitigated her damages and had made
an effort to find employment, thus awarding her $40,000.136 The
circuit court found in support of the NLRB ruling, rejecting
Thalbo's collateral estoppel claim. 137 In support of the court's
affirmation of the NLRB ruling, the court found that: (1) the
issues were not identical; (2) the interests of a Title VII litigant
were different from the interests of the NLRB in unfair labor
practice proceedings; (3) the province of the NLRB concerned
the relationship between employer and the union; (4) a finding of
mitigation was relevant to the NLRA proceeding; (5) in Title
VII, the issue of back pay was not essential to determining
liability; and (6) failure to reinstate an employee under NLRA
was relevant to discriminatory labor practice. 138
135 DiMilta, No. 92 Civ. 6468, slip op. at 12.
136 323 N.L.R.B. at 638.
137 171 F.3d at 109. Thalbo contended that because of collateral estoppel,
plaintiff was entitled to no backpay. Id.
131 NLRB, 171 F.3d at 109-14.
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